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Abstract—Users of technology services try to evaluate the 
risks of disclosing personal information in light of the benefits 
they believe they will receive. However, because of cognitive, time 
or other constraints, users concentrate on minimizing the 
uncertainties of disclosure – reducing their level of privacy 
concern – by using a limited set of information cues. We suggest 
an individual’s information-seeking behavior is focused on those 
cues which are important to them. Q methodology was used to 
determine if users of technology services can be segmented, based 
on the type of information cues they consider important – many 
of which are related to technology services’ privacy behavior. 
The study consisted of 58 participants split into two cohorts, who 
rank-ordered 40 statements describing the attributes of a 
technology service. In our study, 69% of participants loaded 
significantly into only one of five groups: 1) Information 
Controllers; 2) Security Concerned; 3) Benefits Seekers; 4) Crowd 
Followers; and 5) Organizational Assurance Seekers. Only 12% of 
participants did not load significantly into any of the five groups. 
Our findings assist practitioners in understanding how their 
privacy behavior (e.g. repurposing information) and privacy-
sensitive technology design (e.g. providing feedback and control 
mechanisms) could encourage or discourage the adoption of 
technology services by different types of users. We argue the user 
segmentation identified by this study can inform the construction 
of more holistic privacy personas. 
Keywords—information privacy, Q methodology, information-
seeking behaviors, privacy concern, trust 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
An oft-quoted piece of advice to presenters is that they 
“must know their audience”. Technology services1, such as an 
e-commerce website, social networking or smartphone 
application, often request personal information in return for 
benefits (e.g. access to required information, social contact, 
entertainment, discounts, etc.). Existing non-contextual 
measures of privacy concern do not assist organizations 
providing technology services to understand what is important 
to their audience – particularly in terms of the organization 
and technology’s privacy behavior. Users of technology 
services have expectations and assumptions when first 
                                                          
1 A technology service is a socio-technical system consisting of a technology 
platform – referred to as the technology lens – and its providing organization 
[1]. 
engaging with a technology service. If its privacy behavior 
does not match those expectations (e.g. the user is unaware 
that data about them is being collected and shared with other 
parties), they may respond emotionally and reject it, or distrust 
the motives of the providing organization [2], [3]. 
Organizations need to understand how their privacy behavior 
– particularly their ability and motivation [4] to safeguard 
peoples’ personal information – encourages or discourages 
acceptance of their technology services, and users’ willingness 
to provide personal information. Furthermore, organizations 
need to appreciate the differing importance users attach to 
various aspects of a technology service – particularly those 
relating to its privacy behavior; they must therefore truly 
‘know their audience’. 
Existing privacy concern measures, like Concern For 
Information Privacy (CFIP) [5] and Internet Users Information 
Privacy Concern (IUIPC) [6] – two of the more influential [7] 
– offer the practitioner limited assistance in understanding the 
cues people seek to assess whether an organization can be 
trusted with their personal information [4], [8]. Privacy 
concern measures usually exclude users’ expectations, 
assumptions and perceptions of the providing organization [2], 
which are often influenced by information cues, such as its 
prominence, reputation or brand image [9]. For example, an 
individual’s concern about the collection of personal 
information – a sub-scale in CFIP and IUIPC – is likely to be 
influenced by their perception of an organization’s ability and 
motivation. Existing privacy concern measures also ignore the 
nature of the technology platform used in a technology-
mediated transaction [10]. 
This paper describes an innovative use of Q methodology 
in privacy and trust research, where participants ranked 
statements describing aspects of an ‘ideal’ generic technology 
service – particularly its privacy behavior – in order of 
importance to them in their decision to use it, and provide it 
with their personal information. Q methodology is a research 
method combining qualitative and quantitative approaches – 
first developed by Stephenson [11] – and used in social 
sciences and psychology to investigate peoples’ subjective 
viewpoints. Given the subjective nature of privacy [2], we 
believe it is an appropriate research method for investigating 
what most and least influences peoples’ decision to use a 
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technology service, and determining if salient groupings can 
be identified. For example, unless solely focused on the 
benefits provided by a technology service, some people will 
seek organizational assurances – possibly in the form of its 
privacy policy [8] – whilst others will ask friends and family. 
The majority of statements used in the study are structured 
around a framework for organizational privacy practice 
previously proposed by the authors [1]. The results from this 
study therefore assist practitioners in understanding which 
aspects of their privacy practice are most and least likely to 
influence users’ decision making. 
II. RELATED WORK 
An individual’s use of a technology service can be viewed 
as a technology-mediated interaction between an information 
sender (e.g. an individual) and an information receiver (e.g. an 
organization) via a technology platform (e.g. an e-commerce 
website). Technology-mediated interactions usually take place 
because the information sender has goals, and must balance 
the risks of relinquishing some aspect of their information 
privacy against their need to achieve these goals (e.g. releasing 
their location to a restaurant-finder smartphone application). 
Olivero & Lunt concluded from their study of information 
disclosure in e-commerce exchanges that “[…] an emerging 
theme is that of a diffused lack of trust in e-commerce 
exchanges leading to a pragmatic evaluation of costs and 
rewards associated with disclosure” [9, p. 258]. This echoes 
Culnan & Bies who observed that individuals “disclose 
personal information as long as they perceive that they receive 
benefits that exceed the current or future risks of disclosure” 
[12, p. 327]. With reference to Berger & Calabrese’s 
Uncertainty Reduction Theory, Beldad et al [8] suggest an 
individual’s uncertainty about the risks of information 
disclosure triggers privacy concerns, leading to information-
seeking behaviors. They observe, “uncertainties cause 
discomfort, people seek to eliminate them by acquiring 
pertinent information” – with privacy policies often being the 
only resource [8, p. 222]. 
Even if perfect information about a technology service is 
feasible, bounded rationality and psychological factors will 
influence an individual’s decision making [13], and they will 
concentrate on finding information about the attribute(s) of a 
technology service they consider important. If they are unable 
to do so, or can only find limited evidence, their level of 
privacy concern is likely to increase. For example, individuals 
who do read privacy policies may become concerned if the 
providing organization does not have one, or its description of 
information use is ambiguous. Similarly, individuals may seek 
environmental cues relating to a technology service, with their 
level of concern increasing if none of their friends have used it 
[10]. These concerns are underpinned by an individual’s 
dispositional privacy concern [14]. Users “who have totally 
submitted to the belief that information disclosure is extremely 
risky” are unlikely to be influenced to share information [8, p. 
228] – even if a technology service’s privacy policy embodies 
fair information practices. 
One of the authors has previously proposed a grammar of 
privacy concern (Fig. 1) [10], which uses a similar approach 
to McKnight & Chervany’s grammar of trust [15], with three 
layers: 1) dispositional privacy concern – “an individual’s 
innate concern about disclosing any information to other 
parties”; 2) environmental privacy concern – “an individual’s 
level of privacy concern created from environmental cues, 
such as media reports, anecdotes from friends and family, and 
social privacy norms”; and 3) interpersonal privacy concern – 
“an individual’s level of privacy concern about the party they 
are transacting with” [10, pp. 267–268]. The shading in Fig. 1 
represents the increasing influence of context on each layer. 
Context has most influence on an individual’s privacy concern 
about a specific information sender, but a weak influence on 
their dispositional privacy concern. 
 
Fig. 1. Grammar of Privacy Concern. Based on [10] 
In a technology-mediated interaction, an information 
sender (trustor) must decide whether to trust the information 
receiver (trustee) with their personal information, in return for 
the benefits of using a technology service. Mayer et al define 
trust as, “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the 
actions of another party based on the expectation that the 
other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party” [16, p. 712]. When initially engaging with a trustee, a 
trustor will form a perception of the trustworthiness of the 
trustee based on the trust signals emitted by the trustee [4]. 
These trust signals include trust symbols (e.g. use of the 
HTTPS padlock and trusted third party seals), and trust 
symptoms (e.g. user reviews and the design of the technology 
service) [4]. Trust signals are typically only used during the 
first few transactions between trustor and trustee. After this 
the trustor expects the trustee to fulfill their obligations, and 
will not consider there to be a risk.  
We suggest a trustor uses trust signals to ascertain a 
trustee’s likely privacy behavior. If the trustee’s privacy 
behavior deviates from the trustor’s expectations (e.g. 
collected information is repurposed), they may respond 
emotionally, distrusting the trustee’s motives [2], [3]. At the 
interpersonal layer (Fig. 1) a trustor is therefore likely to seek 
evidence of the trustee’s ability and motivation [4] to 
safeguard their personal information. At the environmental 
cues layer (Fig. 1) a trustor may seek comfort from a 
technology service being used by friends or family, or positive 
media reports about similar technology services. 
We previously proposed a framework for effective privacy 
practice, which unifies an organization’s ability and 
motivation in safeguarding personal information [1]. For a 
technology-mediated interaction between an information 
sender and information receiver, our layered Privacy Security 
Trust (PST) Framework unifies in one model: 1) the delivery 
of effective privacy practice within the information receiver; 
2) the construction of trust between the information sender and 
 
information receiver; and 3) the characteristics of the 
technology platform used. The PST Framework represents 
effective privacy practice as five layers: 1) information 
security – protecting information assets from threats; 2) 
information management – providing control over information 
assets; 3) information principles – describing the rules which 
guide an information receiver in using its information assets; 
4) information use – defining the use to which an information 
receiver will put the information assets in its possession; and 
5) information privacy culture – assisting the information 
receiver in making decisions about which information assets 
to collect, store, process, disseminate and share. 
III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS & METHOD 
A. Research Questions 
The study’s primary research objective was to investigate 
if salient groupings could be identified based on the relative 
importance people attach to information about: 1) a 
technology service’s privacy behavior; 2) a technology 
service’s facilities for feedback and control of personal 
information; 3) any consequences of using a technology 
service; 4) the benefits of using a technology service; 5) 
protection if problems occur using a technology service; 6) the 
attributes of a technology service; and 7) environmental cues 
(e.g. the advice of friends and family). 
Two of the principal criticisms of Q methodological 
studies is their reliability and generalizability [17]. However, 
concerns about replicability – an important form of reliability 
– where similar viewpoints emerge across different Q samples, 
have been found to be unwarranted [17]. Nevertheless, a 
secondary research objective was to ascertain if similar salient 
groupings could be identified from two samples of participants 
using different implementations of the same experiment. 
B. Use of Q Methodology 
Q methodology uses stimuli – implemented as a set of 
statements called a ‘Q-set’2 – representative of a wide breadth 
of discourse about a research topic or issue of interest. 
Participants – the ‘P-sample’ – are asked to rank the 
statements in a Q-set – a process called ‘Q-sorting’ – in an 
order which is important or relevant to them3 using a forced 
distribution grid – typically quasi-normal (Fig. 2). This has the 
advantage that statements people find most important are 
equally psychologically significant to those they find least 
important [18]. It also prevents participants from selecting all 
statements as important – a common problem with surveys. Q 
methodology uses by-person factor analysis of the 
intercorrelated matrix of Q-sorts – the ranking of statements 
by each participant – to group them into factors that are 
statistically similar, i.e. participants in a factor are those who 
ordered statements similarly. 
The specific rankings of individual statements using Q 
methodology have been shown to be broadly similar to those 
produced by a Likert attitude scale [19]. However, Q 
methodology not only “distinguish[es] salient groupings 
                                                          
2 Sometimes called a ‘Q-sample’. 
3 In the study, participants ranked Q-set statements from ‘Most Important’ 
(+5) to ‘Least Important’ (-5) using the grid shown in Fig. 2. 
within the population with similarly structured attitudes 
towards an image object”, but “results in segmentation on the 
basis of functional content-specific criteria” [19, p. 516] – 
essential for the study’s primary research objective. 
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Fig. 2. Forced distribution for Q-sorting used in the study 
A characteristic of Q methodology is that sample sizes are 
small (i.e. 10-20 participants). A typical ratio of statements to 
participants is 1:3 (i.e. three participants in the P-sample for 
each Q-set statement), but this can drop to 1:2 [20]. Another 
useful heuristic is that at least three participants should load 
significantly on a factor [20]. As Brown [21] observes, “since 
the interest of Q methodology is in the nature of the segments 
and the extent to which they are similar or dissimilar, the 
issue of large numbers, so fundamental to most social 
research, is rendered relatively unimportant.”. A Q 
methodological study only requires sufficient participants to 
establish the existence of a factor, and be able to delineate it. 
The problem – inherent in normal factor analysis – of whether 
a sample is sufficiently large to be generalisable to a wider 
population does not afflict Q methodology [22]. 
C. Construction of Concourse and Q-Set 
The first step in Q methodology – the creation of a 
concourse, of which the Q-set is a subset – used transcripts 
from an earlier qualitative study by one of the authors in 
which privacy-affecting technology services were discussed 
by focus groups [10]. The focus groups’ transcripts were 
coded using ATLAS.ti, with 73 base-level codes grouped into 
16 super-codes. To investigate the primary research question, 
ten of the 16 super-codes relate to quotations in the focus 
group transcripts relating to the organization and technology 
lens components of the PST Framework [1]. The remaining 
six codes relate to quotations about: 1) consequences for the 
individual of using a technology service; 2) an individual’s 
privacy calculus; 3) legal protection for the individual; 4) 
features of a technology service; 5) environmental cues; and 6) 
benefits provided by a technology service. 
A structured Q-set was created using a balanced-block 
approach [22, p. 59], with 40 statements split into 15 sub-
categories representing 15 of the 16 ATLAS.ti super-codes4. 
The statements within each category represent the base-level 
codes with the largest number of coded quotations. Use of the 
balanced-block approach ensured that just over half of the 
statements relate to a technology service, with 13 statements 
mapped to the six sub-categories in the organization 
component of the PST Framework [1], and 10 mapped to the 
four sub-categories in the technology lens component. The 
remaining 17 statements are split approximately equally across 
the remaining five categories (Table IV). 
                                                          
4 Privacy calculus is a cognitive process, and not something an individual 
might seek for reassurance; it was therefore excluded from the concourse. 
The Q-set statements are positively worded to avoid the 
problem of participants trying to rank negatively-worded 
statements. It also forces them to consider the factors which 
are particularly important and unimportant to them, when 
faced with an ‘ideal’ technology service. In addition, the 
statements and participant instructions make no reference to 
specific technology services, to minimize the potential effect 
of organizational reputation. 
D. Sampling 
One of the research objectives was to investigate if two 
different implementations of the Q-sort produced broadly 
similar results. The study’s P-sample was therefore split into 
two approximately equal-sized cohorts: 1) an online cohort – 
who used an online Q methodology tool called FlashQ5 to 
perform their Q-sort; and 2) an offline cohort – who carried 
out their Q-sorts using a printed Q-set under laboratory 
conditions at University College London (UCL). The 
demographic profile of the two cohorts is shown in Table I. 
TABLE I.  PARTICIPANT PROFILE OF ONLINE & OFFLINE COHORTS 
Demographic 
Characteristic Category 
Online 
Cohort  
(N = 27) 
Offline 
Cohort 
(N = 31) 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
48% 
52% 
 
32% 
68% 
 
Age (years) 
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
Over 65 
 
37% 
11% 
19% 
19% 
15% 
0% 
 
61% 
10% 
13% 
10% 
3% 
3% 
 
Maximum level 
of education 
achieved 
School leaver 
Diploma 
Undergraduate 
Postgraduate  
Rather not say 
 
15% 
19% 
37% 
22% 
7% 
 
11% 
37% 
37% 
15% 
0% 
 
Computer 
Experience 
(years) 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
19.1 
8.7 
 
14.5 
5.2 
 
1) Online Cohort 
The online cohort, which took place between March and 
July 2013, was sampled from two sources: 
1. Structured sampling of participants who completed an 
online survey (N = 140) investigating attitudes about 
personal information and technology adoption6. 
2. Structured sampling of an opportunistic sample of 
participants (N = 26) who completed an online survey 
including the Desire for Privacy (DFP) and Concern 
about Privacy Behavior of Organizations and 
Governments (CPBOG) measurement instruments, 
previously piloted by one of the authors [14]6. 
To minimize the homogeneity of the online cohort, 50 
participants were selected randomly within different levels of 
privacy concern measured by these two online surveys. Of the 
                                                          
5 FlashQ – originally developed by G. Braehler and C. Hackert – allows 
participants to carry out Q-sorts using a web browser (see 
http://www.hackert.biz/flashq/home/). A newer version – updated by R. 
Hoodenpyle – was used in the study (see http://qmethod.org/links). 
6 Participants completing these two online surveys were informed that they 
might be selected to complete a future online exercise. 
50 participants, 39 completed the study. To mitigate the 
possibility that some of the 39 participants may not have read 
the Q-set statements carefully, or given them proper 
consideration, 12 of the 39 Q-sorts – completed in less than 
70% of the cohort’s mean completion time7 – were excluded. 
2) Offline Cohort 
The offline cohort, which took place between September 
and October 2013, consisted of 31 participants –  mostly from 
UCL’s Psychology Subject Pool – who volunteered for the 
study; no structured sampling of this cohort took place. 
E. Research Method 
Participants in the offline cohort completed a paper-based 
survey at the start of their session requesting demographic 
information and asking them to complete the DFP and 
CPBOG measurement instruments [14]. The remainder of the 
process for the offline and online cohorts was the same, thus: 
1. If participants had started using a technology service 
in the last six months, they were asked to provide the 
name of the technology service, and up to three 
reasons why they felt comfortable to use it and 
provide it with their personal information8.  
2. Participants were told to think generally about 
technology services, given the 40 Q-set statements in 
random order, and asked to sort them into three piles: 
1) most important; 2) least important; and 3) neutral, 
in their decision to use a technology service. 
3. Participants were asked to place the Q-set statements 
from the three piles on the Q-sort grid (Fig. 2). 
4. Once the participant had completed their Q-sort, they 
were asked to provide the reasons why they had 
ranked a particular statement as +5, and another as -5. 
The Q-sorts took approximately 30-35 minutes, for which 
participants were paid the equivalent of US$8. The study was 
approved by the designated ethics officer in the Computer 
Science Department at UCL, who decided it did not require 
full ethical clearance from UCL’s Ethics Committee. 
IV. FACTOR ANALYSIS 
A. Onlineand Offline Cohorts - Initial Analysis 
It was hypothesized that there should be no significant 
difference in the distributions of the online and offline cohorts, 
when taken as a whole (i.e. the two cohorts should rank the 
statements in broadly the same order). A Mann-Whitney U 
test showed there was no statistically significant difference in 
the scores for each of the 40 statements for the online and 
offline cohorts, with results ranging from U = 414; z = -0.071; 
p= 0.94 (sig ≤ 0.05, 2-tailed) for statement 30 to U = 305; z = -
1.79; p = 0.074 (sig ≤ 0.05, 2-tailed) for statement 38. 
A Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was run 
separately on the two cohorts’ Q-sorts using PQMethod9 to 
                                                          
7 This was approximately 11 or 13 minutes, depending on whether a 
participant had entered reasons for starting to use a technology service. 
8 The analysis of this data is outside the scope of this paper. 
9 Peter Schmolck, PQMethod Version 2.33 (December 2012) available at 
http://schmolck.userweb.mwn.de/qmethod/downpqwin.htm. 
ascertain the number of factors to initially extract using 
centroid analysis. Statistical tests, including Kaiser-Guttman’s 
criterion, the existence of at least two significantly loading (≥ 
0.41) Q-sorts, Humphrey’s rule10 and Cattell’s scree test [22] 
indicated that between four and six factors should be extracted 
from the offline cohort, and seven from the online cohort. 
B. Offline Cohort – Centroid Factor Analysis 
Six factors were initially extracted using centroid factor 
analysis – the preferred method of Q practitioners [22] – from 
the 31 Q-sorts in the offline cohort. There was no theoretical 
foundation for manually rotating the factors subjectively, so 
varimax rotation was used to achieve the best mathematical 
fit. This resulted in the first four, and the sixth factors having 
five or more significantly loading Q-sorts; the fifth factor was 
therefore discarded as it had none. The five-factor solution 
explains 46% of the study variance – a “sound solution on the 
basis of common factors” [22, p. 105] – with 21 Q-sorts (68%) 
loading significantly on only one factor; the factors’ inter-
correlations are shown in Table II. Although Factor 4 is a 
bipolar factor – with one significantly loading Q-sort at its 
negative pole and four at its positive pole – this is not 
considered a problem [22]. There are seven confounded Q-
sorts and three Q-sorts not loading significantly on any factor. 
TABLE II.  INTER-CORRELATIONS BETWEEN OFFLINE FACTOR SCORES 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1  0.554 0.295 -0.042 0.680 
2 -0.554  0.223 -0.144 0.455 
3 -0.295 0.223  -0.387 0.225 
4 -0.042 0.144 0.387  0.057 
5 -0.680 0.455 0.225 -0.057  
C. Online Cohort – Centroid Factor Analysis 
Seven factors were initially extracted using centroid factor 
analysis from the 27 Q-sorts in the online cohort. Varimax 
rotation resulted in six factors, each with two or more 
significantly loading Q-sorts. One factor had no significantly 
loading Q-sorts and another only two. A second centroid 
factor analysis was therefore run extracting six factors. This 
resulted in the first three, the fifth and sixth factors having at 
least three significant loadings; the fourth factor was therefore 
discarded. 
TABLE III.  INTER-CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ONLINE FACTOR SCORES 
Factor 1 2 3 4 5 
1  0.395 0.552 0.363 0.161 
2 0.395  0.481 0.389 0.350 
3 0.552 0.481  0.340 0.210 
4 0.363 0.389 0.341  0.230 
5 0.161 0.350 0.210 0.230  
The five-factor solution explains 48% of study variance, 
with 20 Q-sorts (74%) loading significantly on only one 
factor; the factors’ inter-correlations are shown in Table III. 
There are four confounded Q-sorts, and three Q-sorts not 
loading significantly on any factor. 
                                                          
10 Humphrey’s rule was strictly applied, where the cross-product of the 
absolute value of the two highest loadings in a factor should be greater than 
twice the standard error. 
D. Factor Interpretation & Alignment 
Watts & Stenner [22] suggest the use of a data-driven crib 
sheet for highlighting items of importance in the factor array 
produced by Q-sort analysis, in line with Stephenson’s belief 
that Q methodology should be a holistic procedure, rather than 
a reductionist, statement-by-statement approach. To aid factor 
interpretation, a crib worksheet was developed in Microsoft 
Excel® for each factor in a cohort to highlight: a) statements 
ranked +5 or -5; b) statements ranked higher or equal highest; 
and c) statements ranked lower or equal lowest, by that factor. 
The crib worksheet was then used to create the factor 
narratives through a process of abduction. 
Unlike typical Q methodology studies which use a single 
sample, our study had two cohorts. One of the research 
objectives was to determine if the online and offline Q-sorts 
produced broadly similar groupings of participants (i.e. 
factors). This made analysis particularly challenging, as two 
factors (one from each cohort) would be unlikely to rank 
statements exactly the same. Nevertheless, if a factor from one 
cohort ranked statements in a category between +4 and +5, a 
potentially equivalent factor from the other cohort should rank 
most (if not all) of the statements in the same category 
positively and within one position, i.e. between +3 and +4. A 
Microsoft Excel® factor comparison spreadsheet was 
developed to highlight where factors from the offline and 
online cohorts both ranked the same statement: a) highest in 
their cohort; b) lowest in their cohort; c) neutral or ±1; d) 
higher than +1 and within one position; or e) lower than -1 and 
within one position. Determining which factors from the two 
cohorts most closely aligned was performed, thus: 
1. The crib worksheet of an unaligned factor in the 
offline cohort (Factor X) was used to determine the 
category with the most statements ranked highest and 
very few (or no) statements ranked lowest – this was 
the principal focus of Factor X. 
2. The factor comparison spreadsheet was used to find a 
factor from the online cohort (Factor Y) with the most 
statements in the same principal focus category ranked 
higher than the other factors in its cohort. The 
statements which the offline and online factors ranked 
lowest were also checked to confirm broad agreement. 
3. The degree of agreement between Factor X and Factor 
Y concerning statement ranking was checked using 
the factor comparison spreadsheet. Factors were 
considered to be aligned when the number of 
statements they ranked similarly was higher than 
possible alignments with other factors. Occasionally, 
it was necessary to subjectively relax this criterion to 
satisfy step 2. 
The alignment and composition of the five factors is 
shown in Tables IV and V. Full factor narratives are provided 
in Section VII for the two factors with the largest number of 
significantly loading Q-sorts, with the appropriate Q-set 
statement references (Table IV) provided in parentheses for 
each part of the narratives; the remaining three factors are 
provided as summary interpretations. To illustrate the essence 
of each factor, the narratives also include participants’ reasons 
for ranking particular statements as +5 or -5. 
TABLE IV.  CATEGORIZED Q-SET STATEMENTS, OFFLINE AND ONLINE COHORT FACTOR ARRAYS, AND FACTOR ALIGNMENT
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General 1 The organization has a good reputation 0 -3 +3 +2 +2 +1 +3 +4 0 0 
General 2 The organization is of a suitable size for the technology service it is offering -4 -2 -3 0 -5 -4 -1 -5 -2 -2 
General 3 The organization appears to be competent -3 -1 -1 -2 -2 +2 +2 0 -2 -1 
Information Privacy Culture 4 The organization tells me it will not mislead me about the collection and use of my personal information +1 -2 +3 0 -3 -1 -2 -1 +2 +4 
Information Privacy Culture 5 The organization tells me it takes looking after my personal information seriously 0 -4 0 +1 -3 +1 -3 -2 +1 +3 
Information Use 6 The organization will tell me which items of my personal information it is going to share with other organizations, and why +2 +3 +2 0 0 +1 0 +3 +3 +1 
Information Use 7 The organization will ask me before it uses my personal information for any purpose other than what it was originally collected for +3 +4 +3 +3 0 -3 +1 +1 +4 +1 
Information Principles 8 The organization's terms and conditions for using the technology service are easy to understand -2 -4 -2 -2 -4 -5 -5 -4 -3 -2 
Information Principles 9 The organization seems to follow applicable laws and regulations -1 0 +2 -1 -1 +2 -1 +3 +2 +2 
Information Management 10 The organization tells me it will look after my personal information properly 0 -5 +1 -1 -4 +2 -1 +2 +2 +4 
Information Management 11
b
 The organization will completely delete all the information it holds about me when I ask it to +1 +2 -3 +1 +3 +1 -1 0 +3 +2 
Information Security 12 The organization appears to have effective security processes to safeguard my personal information +2 0 +5 +5 -1 -1 +1 +3 0 +1 
Information Security 13 The organization will tell me immediately if it gets hacked, or loses my personal information +4 +3 +1 +2 +2 0 +1 +2 +3 +5 
T
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Information Use 14 The technology service will tell me if it is tracking my behavior or location +3 +3 -1 -1 -1 -3 -2 -1 +2 +3 
Information Use 15 The technology service will only collect personal information which is relevant 0 0 0 +2 +1 0 -4 -1 -1 +1 
Information Use 16 The technology service will allow me to check which items of my personal information it is collecting and using, and why +2 +2 +1 0 +2 -3 -2 -1 +1 -1 
Information Principles 17 Although I may not get all the benefits, the technology service will not ask for lots of personal information before it allows me to use it 0 +1 -1 +1 +2 +1 0 -3 -4 -1 
Information Principles 18 The technology service will assume I don't want share my personal information, until I explicitly tell it to do so +2 +1 0 0 +1 +3 0 +1 0 +2 
Information Principles 19 The technology service will not ask me for information I consider sensitive (e.g. income, relationship status, age etc.) +4 +1 +2 +2 -2 -2 -3 -2 -1 0 
Information Management 20 The technology service will allow me to control who can see items of my personal information, and what they can see +5 +4 +1 +1 +4 +2 +2 +4 +1 +2 
Information Management 21 The technology service will allow me to opt-in or opt-out all or parts of it, and see which parts I am enrolled into +3 +2 -2 -1 +3 -2 -2 -1 +2 -2 
Information Security 22 The technology service uses security mechanisms (e.g.  user name and password, or a "padlock" icon in the browser) +2 0 +3 +3 0 0 +3 0 +4 +3 
Information Security 23
b
 The technology's security measures are approved by organizations who I trust (e.g. regulatory authorities) +1 -1 +2 +3 -3 -2 -3 +1 0 +2 
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Consequences for Individual 24 Using the technology service will not affect my security, or the security of my family and friends (e.g. its use won't lead to stalking or 
burglary) 
+3 +5 +4 +3 +2 +2 +1 +5 +1 +1 
Consequences for Individual 25 Using the technology service will not impact me financially (e.g. increased insurance costs, loss of credit status, running costs etc.) +1 +1 +1 +4 +4 +3 +4 +2 +3 +3 
Protection 26 When I use the technology service I believe I will be protected by the law -1 +2 +4 +2 -2 0 0 +2 +1 0 
Protection 27 I believe will be reimbursed if I lose money when using the technology service +1 -1 -1 +4 +1 +4 0 0 +5 0 
Technology Features 28 The technology service looks like it will be easy for me to use -3 -1 -2 -2 +1 0 +2 -2 -1 -5 
Technology Features 29 The technology service looks well-designed, robust and professional -2 0 0 -2 0 +4 +2 0 0 0 
Technology Features 30 The technology service looks exciting and innovative -4 -2 -3 -3 -2 +3 +1 -2 -2 -3 
Technology Features 31 The technology service looks like it will work well with other technologies or services I use (e.g. social networking works well on my 
mobile phone) 
-2 -1 -4 -5 -1 -1 -3 -2 -1 -3 
Environmental Cues 32 I have not heard anything bad in the media about the organization or the technology service -1 -2 -3 -2 -1 -4 +3 +3 -3 -2 
Environmental Cues 33 Lots of people use the technology service and they don't seem to have any problems -2 -2 -2 +1 0 -2 +5 +1 0 -3 
Environmental Cues 34 Other technology services (e.g. Facebook, supermarket loyalty cards etc.) already collect my personal information -3 -3 -5 -4 -3 -1 -1 -4 -3 -2 
Environmental Cues 35 I have done my own research on the organization and technology service and it seems okay -1 0 -4 -4 -2 -1 0 +1 -5 -1 
Environmental Cues 36 My relatives, friends or work colleagues tell me it is okay to use the technology service -2 -3 -1 -3 0 0 +4 0 -3 -3 
Benefits for Individual 37 The benefits offered by the technology service are useful to me -1 +3 +2 -1 +5 +5 +3 +2 -2 -1 
Benefits for Individual 38 The technology service will use my personal information to help me (e.g. save me time and money, help me with my social life etc.) -3 -3 0 -3 +3 -3 +2 -3 -2 -4 
Benefits for Individual 39 I can't get the same benefits offered by the technology service anywhere else -5 +2 0 -3 +3 -2 -4 -3 -4 0 
Benefits for Individual 40 The technology service allows me to decide where, when and how I can use the benefits it provides 0 +1 -2 0 +1 +3 -2 -3 -1 -4 
a.
 Factor scores in bold are those which are highest or equal highest (shaded dark gray) and lowest or equal lowest (shaded light gray) in their cohort. Sub-categories which are the principal focus of each group have a solid border. 
b.
 Statements not based on specific coded quotations in the transcripts from earlier focus group study [10], but created specifically for the Q methodology study and based on discussions in the focus groups relating to the category. 
TABLE V.  COMPOSITION AND ALIGNMENT OF FACTORS IN EACH GROUP 
Group Name Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Explained Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Explained 
No. Significantly 
Loading Into 
Group (N=40)c 
No. of 
Males 
No. of 
Females 
CPBOG 
(N = 28)
e
 
DFP 
(N = 28)
e
 
Information Factor 1 (offline) Factor 4 (online)    (n = 9) (n = 9) 
Controllers 4.92 16% 2.78 10% 10 (25%
d
) 4 6 µ = ϯ.ϳϵ; σ= Ϭ.ϴϲ µ = ϯ.ϰϭ; σ= ϭ.ϭϱ 
Security Factor 2 (offline) Factor 1 (online)    (n = 8) (n = 8) 
Concerned 2.89 9% 2.97 11% 10 (25%
d
) 5 5 µ = ϯ.ϭϰ; σ= Ϭ.ϲϮ µ = ϯ.ϳϮ; σ= Ϭ.ϵϭ 
Benefit Factor 3 (offline) Factor 5 (online)    (n = 5) (n = 5) 
Seekers 2.56 8% 1.76 7% 8 (20%
d
) 3 5 µ = Ϯ.ϳϱ; σ= Ϭ.ϰϬ µ = Ϯ.ϴϴ; σ= Ϭ.ϰϴ 
Crowd Factor 4 (offline) Factor 2 (online)    (n = 3) (n = 3) 
Followers 2.07 7% 2.37 9% 6 (15%
d
) 3 3 µ = ϰ.ϯϯ; σ= Ϭ.92 µ = 2.72; σ= 1.39 
Organizational Factor 5 (offline) Factor 3 (online)    (n = 3) (n = 3) 
Assurance Seekers 2.00 6% 2.86 11% 6 (15%
d
) 1 5 µ = ϯ.ϱϭ; σ= Ϭ.18 µ = Ϯ.ϱϲ; σ= Ϭ.ϴϰ 
c.
 N = 40 as this is the number of participants who loaded significantly into only one group (i.e. excluding the one participant who negatively loaded significantly into Factor 4 (offline)). 
d.
 Percentages calculated as number of participants significantly loading into this group only, divided by total number of participants with only one significant positive loading (N = 40). 
e.
 N = 28, as 20 participants from the offline cohort and 8 from the online cohort completed the DFP and CPBOG measurement instruments [14] and loaded significantly into only one group. The CPBOG and DFP 
scores were calculated as the weighted average of the three items in the scales.
V. IDENTIFIED VIEWPOINTS (FACTOR NARRATIVES) 
A. Information Controllers 
The ability to control the collection, use and dissemination 
of personal information – using mechanisms provided by a 
technology lens – is very important for this group11. This 
echoes the results of a qualitative study by Olivero & Lunt [9], 
who found that e-commerce customers want instruments that 
provide them with active control over their information, 
allowing them to make informed decisions about trading their 
personal information for benefits. 
This group’s principal focus is who has access to their 
personal information and what they can see (20). The desire to 
control the flow of personal information accounts for why this 
group: a) want to know if their behavior or location is being 
monitored (14); b) value the ability to opt-in or opt-out of 
aspects of a technology service (21); c) do not like their 
personal information shared with others unless they have 
given their permission (18); and d) want to be able to monitor 
which items of personal information are being collected (16). 
They also prefer organizations which inform them if their 
personal information is repurposed (7), or shared with other 
parties (6). They may also be reluctant to provide information 
they consider sensitive (19*12), which may explain their focus 
on information control. 
The importance this group attaches to controlling access to 
their personal information may be because of their anxiety 
about its potential effect on their personal security (e.g. 
stalking, burglary, etc.) (24*). A comment from one 
participant (ON.20)13 in this group illustrates this concern: 
“This appears to be the most crucial aspect, as 
safeguarding oneself and one's close ones seems most 
                                                          
11 Factor 1 (offline) ranked six of the eight statements categorized as 
Technology Lens (excluding Information Security) higher than the other 
factors in its cohort; the other two statements were ranked 0 (neutral). Factor 4 
(online) ranked five of the statements higher, with the other three ranked 0 
(neutral) or +1. 
12 References to Q-set statements where the offline and online cohorts did not 
rank the same statement: a) highest in their cohort; b) lowest in their cohort; c) 
neutral or ±1; d) higher than +1 and within one position; or e) lower than -1 
and within one position, are indicated with an asterisk. 
13 Exemplar quotes are from participants who only loaded significantly into 
the group described in the factor narrative. 
fundamental and a higher priority than using a new 
technology service, however useful it may be.” 
However, this group is not particularly concerned about the 
possible financial impact of using a technology service (e.g. 
increased health insurance costs as a result of data collected 
about unhealthy lifestyles) (25). If they do experience 
problems, it is not clear if this group expect to be protected by 
the law (26*), and they are not too concerned whether an 
organization follows applicable laws and regulations (9). This 
may be because they prefer to take control of their personal 
information, rather than rely – post priori – on external 
protection and redress mechanisms. 
Even with their preference for technical controls to manage 
personal information, this group does seek some reassurance 
from the providing organization. Because of their desire to 
control their personal information, they want an organization 
to inform them if a technology service suffers a security 
breach or loses their personal information (13). A participant 
(OFF.7) in this group remarked: 
“In the event important information […] fall[s] into the 
wrong hands, there is potentially a great threat to the 
things I am part of. Stopping it at that stage and notifying 
me would allow me time to change my password and if 
need be, cancel/deactivate my card to prevent fraud 
attempts.” 
Environmental cues – such as the advice of friends and 
family (36), media stories (32), or that others already use a 
technology service (33) – do not influence this group. As one 
participant (OFF.30) observed: 
“Other people may use the technology service without any 
problem but I am not sure who will be the next target of 
fraud or identity theft, so I am not really concerned about 
people using technology without any problem.” 
This group also does not readily accept that a technology 
service can collect personal information simply because others 
(e.g. social networking, supermarket loyalty cards, etc.) 
already do so (34). 
This group are also unlikely to be impressed by 
organizations’ claims concerning their safeguarding of 
personal information (4*, 5*, 10*), perceived competence 
(3*), size (2*) or reputation (1). They are more likely to rely 
upon their ability to control personal information, rather than 
organizations’ assurances. As one participant (OFF.13) noted: 
“[O]rganizations and technological services are not 
always reliable, even when they state that they would not 
share any of my personal information online. I feel that 
the best way to go about doing this is to adopt a self-
regulatory attitude towards the services. I feel more 
assured if I know I can control what I want and not want 
to share with others.” 
The features of a technology service – its ease of use (28*) 
and design (29*) – are likely to be of little interest to this 
group. They are not impressed by a technology just because it 
is innovative or exciting to others (30*). They also do not 
attach any significant importance to benefits, such as 
recommendations or personalization (38). However, it is not 
clear if this group is concerned about not being able to get the 
benefits offered by a technology service elsewhere (39*), or 
the usefulness of the benefits (37*). 
B. Security Concerned 
Security of personal information is of paramount 
importance to this group14, exemplified by a participant 
(ON.10) who stated, “Security is a critical element of the 
service”. This group also values technical security protections, 
such as the HTTPS padlock (22). This emphasis on 
information security is likely to be because of their anxiety 
about the detrimental effects using a technology service might 
have on their personal security (24), and possibly their 
finances (25*). This group’s focus on security may also 
account for their preference for technology services from 
organizations – irrespective of the providing organization’s 
size (2*) and competence (3*) – with sound information 
principles15, a good reputation (1), and approved by, or linked 
with, organizations they trust, such as regulatory authorities or 
payment providers (23). As one participant (ON.37) observed, 
“I trust the regulatory authorities […] [to] give me the best 
protection.” 
Despite the focus on security, this group may not 
necessarily expect to be informed if an organization suffers a 
security breach (13). If a problem occurs, this group considers 
their legal protection to be very important (26), with a 
participant (OFF.1) stating “I feel safer knowing I will be 
protected by the law if anything untoward happens […]”. 
Their desire for legal protection may explain why they are the 
only group who are likely to take an interest in the terms and 
conditions of using a technology service (8). 
This group do not particularly like to be asked for 
information they consider to be sensitive (19) or irrelevant 
(15*), and definitely do not accept that because other 
technology services already collect, process and store 
information, new technology services should be allowed to do 
                                                          
14 Factor 2 (offline) and Factor 1 (online) ranked effective organizational 
information security processes (12) as the most important (+5) statement. In 
addition to an organization’s security processes, Factor 1 ranked three of the 
four statements in the two Information Security sub-categories higher than the 
other factors in its cohort, whilst Factor 2 ranked two of the statements higher. 
15 Factor 2 (offline) ranked both statements categorized as Organization 
(Information Principles) higher than the other factors in its cohort; Factor 1 
(online) ranked one of the two statements higher. 
the same (34). This is part of a wider disregard of 
environmental cues by this group, including media reports 
(e.g. stories about hacking) (32), relatives or friends’ advice 
(36*), and the wider population already using a technology 
service – apparently without problems (33*). As one 
participant (OFF.22) observed, “I would need more validation 
than 'lots of people' as I would want actual authority backup 
[…]”. Despite not relying on environmental cues, this group is 
unlikely to carry out their own research before using a 
technology service (35). The difficulty of determining the 
trustworthiness of new technology services was identified by a 
participant (ON.1) who noted: 
“Many providers of new services are innovative start-ups 
and I would not necessarily expect to have heard of them. 
I don't have time to conduct research on all of the 
companies I come across on the internet […].” 
The features of a technology service, its ease of use (28), 
or design (29*), and whether it is innovative or exciting to 
others (30), is of little interest to this group. They are 
unconcerned about whether it will work well with other 
technologies they already use (e.g. a social networking 
website working well on a smartphone and PC) (31), with a 
participant (ON.10) remarking, “I am not looking for 
integration of services – security is more important.” 
The lack of interest in technology may be why this group 
does not attach great importance to technical means of 
controlling their personal information (20, 18). They are keen 
for the providing organization to assume this responsibility, 
keeping them informed about the use to which their personal 
information is being put (7), why their personal information is 
being collected (4*), and who it is being shared with (6*). 
However, they may not expect an organization to delete their 
personal information when requested (11*). 
Finally, this group is not particularly interested in the 
benefits provided by a technology service (37*) even if they 
cannot get the same benefits elsewhere (39*). Technology 
services that use personal information to provide targeted 
benefits, such as special offers or recommendations, are also 
unlikely to be sought (38*). 
C. Benefit Seekers 
Technology services that provide useful benefits are 
valued by this group – as long as they are not constrained in 
terms of where they can use them (e.g. discount vouchers). 
The principal focus of this group is best characterized by a 
participant (ON.30) who remarked: 
“My main reason for using technology services is some 
sort of personal benefit, so most of all I consider whether 
it will be convenient for me [or] add convenience to my 
life.” 
Despite their focus on the benefits offered by a technology 
service, this group is concerned about the potential financial 
consequences of using it, and want to be reimbursed if they 
lose money. As well as benefits, this group considers its 
functionality to be important, suggesting it possibly has two 
principal foci – benefits and technology. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this group is not too concerned 
about being asked for information they consider to be 
sensitive. Assurances by organizations about stewardship of 
personal information are also of little interest – with one 
participant (OFF.12) declaring: 
“Almost every organization would tell me that they will 
look after my information properly, and that makes no 
difference.” 
The lack of interest in organizations’ assurances may explain 
why this group does not particularly value technology services 
which are approved by, or linked with, organizations they 
trust. The size of the organization providing the technology 
service, and its perceived competence are also likely to be of 
little interest to this group, although they do consider its 
reputation as being slightly important. 
This group does not consider it at all important to read a 
technology service’s terms and conditions. However, this 
should be regarded in light of the relative rankings of 
statement 8 – concerning the readability of a technology 
service’s terms and conditions – which were less than -1 for 
all groups in both cohorts. Although the Q-methodology study 
only captured intended behavior; the low ranking of statement 
8 is consistent with existing studies [23]. 
This group’s low opinion of organizations’ assurances 
about their privacy behavior may be because they like to have 
control of their information (e.g. who has access to personal 
information and what they can see), be kept informed about 
information being shared with third parties, and expect an 
organization to delete personal information when requested. 
This group does not particularly seek out advice 
concerning a technology service from family or friends, and 
are not induced to use a technology service, simply because 
lots of other people may already be using it. They also do not 
readily accept that a technology service can collect personal 
information purely because others already do so; as one 
participant (ON.30) noted, “Just because other services collect 
my information I don't automatically want others to have my 
information”, but admitted, “when signing up for services I 
hardly ever consider what other technology services have 
[access to] my information.” 
Finally, although the sample size is small, and any 
conclusions can only be tentative, the mean CPBOG [14] for 
this group (µ = 2.75; σ = 0.40; n = 5) is the lowest of the five 
groups (Table V). 
D. Crowd Followers 
Use of a technology service by others, the reputation of the 
organization providing the technology service, and the advice 
of family and friends are very important to this group. This is 
best illustrated by a participant (OFF.15) who admitted: 
“I usually choose what technology service to use based on 
relatives and close friends' opinions. They are people I 
can trust so I believe they will give me an honest review.” 
Innovative technology services which look professional, 
robust and easy to use are likely to be preferred by this group, 
with one participant (ON.35) observing, “I like to be using [...] 
innovative products and services. I will always have a look 
and try anything new that sparks my interest.” 
It is therefore not clear from the factor analysis and 
comparison if this group might be better represented as two 
separate, overlapping, groups, both influenced by 
environmental cues, but with one attaching more importance 
to the features of a technology service. 
This group may seek environmental cues for reassurance 
because they like innovative technology services, but are also 
concerned about the possible impact on personal security and 
costs. Their level of comfort with new technology may also 
explain their lack of concern about the collection of irrelevant 
or sensitive personal information. 
E. Organizational Assurance Seekers 
The assurances of organizations – possibly provided as 
privacy policies – about personal information collection, use 
and sharing makes this group comfortable to use a technology 
service. This is exemplified by a participant (ON.28) in this 
group who noted: 
“A written disclaimer stating that it will look after my 
personal information imbues trust in the organization – if 
they go against it, then I have their word that says 
otherwise.” 
This group also looks for other forms of assurance. 
Information security is important for this group. Not only do 
they seek out technological security mechanisms (e.g. the 
HTTPS padlock symbol), but if an organization is not able to 
deliver against its assurances (e.g. its systems are hacked, or it 
loses information) they expect the organization to inform them 
immediately. This may possibly be because of their concern 
about the potential consequences of a breach. 
Environmental cues, such as media reports, the advice of 
family and friends, and widespread use of a technology 
service do not greatly influence this group. This may be 
because this group trusts organizational assurances more than 
media reports. As one participant (OFF.18) remarked, “I think 
some media organizations have stakes in certain services so I 
am reluctant to trust their opinion regarding technology.” 
This group is also not focused on the benefits provided by a 
technology service, nor its features. 
Finally, although the sample size is small, the mean 
CPBOG [14] for this group (µ = 4.33; σ = 0.92; n = 3) is the 
highest of the five groups (Table V). This may be because 
Crowd Followers seek reassurance from others to lessen their 
own privacy concerns. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Our study used Q methodology – an empirical research 
method for eliciting  peoples’ viewpoints, which has not yet 
been used in privacy research – to investigate if salient 
groupings of people could be found, based on the types of 
information cues they seek to minimize their concerns about 
using a technology service, and the perceived risks of 
disclosing personal information to it. Our results show that 40 
of the 58 study participants (69%) could be segmented into 
one of five groups: 1) Information Controllers (25%) – who 
value individual control of the collection and dissemination of 
their personal information; 2) Security Concerned (25%) – 
who are principally concerned about their own security and 
that of their personal information; 3) Benefit Seekers (20%) – 
who focus on the benefits offered by a technology service; 4) 
Crowd Followers (15%) – who follow the actions and advice 
of others; and 5) Organizational Assurance Seekers (15%) – 
who look for organizations’ assurances about how they 
safeguard personal information entrusted to them. Of the 
remaining 18 participants, 11 (19%) could be placed into more 
than one group, and 7 (12%) could not be placed into any 
group. These latter participants may be represented by a group 
not identified by this study. 
Practitioners can use the five-group segmentation to 
inform the construction of default privacy personas. For 
example, a social networking site could allow users to set their 
privacy preferences to “follow the privacy settings of like-
minded people”. However, our study shows that control over 
the disclosure of information – usually implemented as 
privacy preferences – is the principal focus of only 25% of 
study participants. The remainder prioritized cues relating to 
organizations’ privacy behavior (Security Concerned and 
Organizational Assurance Seekers), and the behavior and 
advice of others (Crowd Followers). This latter group – who 
represent 15% of participants in the study – are influenced by 
information coming from the environment, of which trust 
symptoms [4] – difficult for organizations to forge or 
manipulate – are a significant component. 
We suggest the findings from our study can assist 
practitioners in implementing the Seven Foundational 
Principles of Privacy by Design (PbD) [24]. In particular, 
recognition of the different information-seeking preferences of 
users can help practitioners meet the 7th PbD principle – 
respect for user privacy. By understanding what is important 
to different types of users, practitioners can ensure their 
technology services address users’ privacy expectations. 
The offline and online Q-sorts were undertaken 
approximately 6-8 months apart. There is the potential 
therefore for external events (e.g. media stories about hacking) 
to have influenced the two cohorts differently. However, we 
suggest that any proposed segmentation of users will need to 
be largely immune to such effects. 
Our study did not investigate if the lack, or inadequacy of 
information cues sought by an individual raises their level of 
privacy concern, and hence their reluctance to adopt a 
technology service – this is the focus of future work. 
Nevertheless, our results suggest a more holistic approach to 
modeling privacy concern is required, which encompasses 
peoples’ perceptions of the technology lens and information 
receiver components of a technology service [1]. Privacy 
research has largely focused on the efficacy of various privacy 
controls and preferences. Even the most usable of privacy-
protecting mechanisms cannot mitigate an Organizational 
Assurance Seeker’s distrust of an organization who offers little 
or no information in their privacy policy, or a Crowd 
Follower’s disquiet that none of their friends have used a 
particular technology service. 
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